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INTRODUCTION
On March 23, 2004, Vanessa Lynch received a phone call of
the worst kind-reporting news of her father's murder. When
Lynch arrived at the house, she discovered a crime scene
scrubbed clean2 Lynch learned that police failed to block off
the crime area and discarded a bottle left by the murderers at
the scene. Lynch did not attribute this nonchalance toward
evidence preservation to bad faith.4 Instead, she blamed the
nationwide lack of education regarding modern forensic
techniques)
In August 2004, Lynch founded the DNA Project, a non-
profit organization with the mission to advance criminal justice
in South Africa by expanding use of DNA evidence with a
national DNA criminal intelligence database.6 The DNA Project
pursues this objective through three avenues: legislation,
education, and building the infrastructure for a DNA database
with capacity to grow. 7 In December 2008, the South African
1. See Carte Blanche, FORENSICS (Sept. 2, 2007, 12:00 PM), http://beta.mnet.co.za/
carteblanchc/Artidce.aspx?Id=3379 (describing the nurder of John Lynch); Moyiga
Nduru, South Africa: How Discarded Bottles Led to the 'DNA Project' INTER PRESS SLRV.
NEWS AGENCY (Feb. 27, 2007), http://www.ipsnews.net/africa/nota.asp~idnevs=36756
(identifying the incident as the catalyst for Vanessa Lynch's cmergence as the leader of
the South Mrican DNA movement).
2. See Carte Blanche, supra note I (describing the mismanaged murder
investigation); Helen Baiford, SA Way Behind on DNA Files: World's Crime-Fighters
Stunned by Lax Progress, WEEKEND AR(US (S. Afr.), Oct. 16, 2010. at 7 (providing
Lynch's account of the crime scene).
3. See Carte Blanche, supra note 1. (recalling police justification for the disposal of
potential evidence because they "d[id] not have the technology to uplift DNA evidence
from th [e] bottle," but citing Lynch's contention that even at the time, the authorities
had the technology to lift a DNA sampic fron the bottlc): Bamford, supra not 2
(conveying Lynch's account of a flawed criminal investigation).
4. See Carte Blanche, supra note I (conveying Lynch's belief that this wvas a case of
ignorance rather than one of sabotage); Nduru, supra note 1. (quoting Lynch's
preference to not point fingers at the police).
5. See Carte Blanche, supra note I (discussing the shortfall of DNA education in
South Arica); Banford, supra note 2 (explaining Lynch's insight into South African
criminal investigation procedures).
6. See Meet the Team, DNA PROJECT, http://dnaproject.co.za/about-us/meet-the-
earn (last visited Oct. 9. 2012) (summarizing the founding of the DNA Project); What
We Do, DNA PROJECT, http://dnaproject.co.za/about-us/what-wc-do (last visited Jan. 7,
2013) (describing the mission of the DNA Project and the actions taken by the
orgaization in pursuit of its nission).
7. See VANLSA LYNCH & CAROLYN HANCOCK, OPEN SOC'Y FOUND. FOR S. AFR.,
DNA: THE 21 ST CENTURY DETECTIVT 41 (2009) (outlining the approach adopted by the
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Cabinet adopted The Criminal Law (Forensic Procedures)
Amendment Bill ("DNA Bill"), introducing the bill to
Parliament in January 2009.8 The DNA Bill remains in
Parliament to this day and is unlikely to pass in the near future.
Issues such as mistrust of the government and privacy concerns
present a particularly daunting challenge to lawmakers who wish
to pass DNA legislation.'o
Part I of this Note discusses the background of the DNA
Bill. Next, Part II compares the issues facing the South African
DNA movement with those encountered by the British and
American programs and discusses the actions taken to address
such issues in each case. Part II then explores the causes of the
stagnation of the DNA Bill in the South African Parliament. Part
III recommends a course of action for the future of the DNA
Bill.
1. THE DNA BILL AND SOUTH AFRICA
To fully illustrate the backdrop for the issues holding back
the DNA Bill, Part I explores the South African government,
both in terms of its history and current structure. Part I.A
examines the government's infrastructure and political
DNA Project to expand the use of DNA evidence in South Africa); REPORT OF THE
PORTFOLTO COMMITTEE ON POLICE: STU DY l TOUR TO CANADA AN) THF UNIFT)
KINGDOM (Nov. 2, 2011) [hereinafter PORTFOLIO COMMITTLL REPORT] (providing a
history of the DNA program).
8. See A New DNA Bill, DNA PROJECT, http://dnaproject.co.za/legislation-
hoiepagc/ egislation/a-new-dna-bill (last visited June 12, 2012) (describing the bill
and the issues that it addresses); DNA: The Crime-Fighting Tool that Needs to Be Used,
WITNESS (S. Afr.) (Sept. 3, 2010), http://wiT.witness.co.za/index.php?
showcontcnt&globai%5B id%5D=46802 [hereinafter Crie-Fighting Tool] (noting the
importance of the DNA Bill); PORTFOLIO COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 7, at 3
(sunmarizing the history of the DNA Bill).
9. See Ernest Mabuza. SA is Ulikely to Pass DNA Legislation Any Time Soon, BUs. DAY
(S. Afr.) (Feb. 28, 2011), http:,// wy.businessday.co.za/articles/Content.aspxid=
135709 (reasoning that the DNA Bill is unlikely to pass soon); Tebogo Monana, Stalled
Bill Could Save Lives, SOWETAN LIVL (S. Mir.) (Aug. 27. 2012), http://mw,.sowetanlive.
co.za/news/2012/08/27/stalled-bill-could-save-lives (reporting the ongoing delay of
the DNA Bill).
10. See Mabuza, supra note 9 (positing that someone could remove a DNA samplc
and plant it at a crime scene to frame someone else); see U.N. OFFICE ON D)RUGS &
CRIME COUNTRY CORRUPTION ASSESSMENT REPORT: SOUTH AFRICA 2 (2003), available
at http://www.info.gov.za/ otherdocs/2003/corruption.pdf [hereinafter UN RLuPORT]
(reporting on corruption in the South African government).
20131] 507
508 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 36:505
atmosphere to provide context for the DNA Bill. Part LB
examines the DNA Bill itself, discussing the key provisions and
their purpose. Part I.C explains the benefits of a DNA database
and identifies the effects of not passing DNA legislation.
A. The South African Governent
South Africa's national government consists of three
branches: executive, legislative, and judicial." The legislative
branch consists of Parliament, a bicameral law-making body.1
The Cabinet, representing the executive branch, includes the
President and numerous departments, each with the purpose of
implementing legislation and providing designated services to
the public." In the judicial branch, the Constitutional Court and
Supreme Court of Appeal serve as the highest appellate
authorities for constitutional issues and non-constitutional issues
respectively. 14
The government structure as it exists today dates back to
the fall of apartheid in 1994, which led to the adoption of a new
constitution two years later.1 The South African Constitution
contains a bill of rights guaranteeing protection of enumerated
11. See S. AFR. CONST.. 1996, ch. 4-5, 8 (creating the three branches of the new
government).
12. See How Parlianent is Structured?, PARTIAMENT OF THE REP. OF S. XFR.,
http://wmy.parliament.gov.za/live/COntCnt.php(ategolyID=25 (last visited June 12,
2012) (explaining that the National Assembly is the house elected directly by voters
and the National Council of Provinces is elected by the provinces); The Governent of
South Africa: Overview, WESTERN CAPE GOV'T, http://www.westerncape.gov.za/your
gov/595 (last visited Oct. 3, 2012) [hereinafter Government oJ Souath Africa Overview]
(noting that the National Assembly consists of 400 clected representatives and the
National Council of Provinces consists of fifty-four permancnt, members and thirty-six
special delegates representing the nine provinces).
13. See Government of South Africa Overview, supra note 12 (listing forty-one
government departments as well as the names and positions of the officials in President
jacob Zuma's Cabinet); S. XFR. CONST., 1996, ch. 5, § 85 (outlining the role of the
executive branch).
14. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, ch. 8, § 165-68 (distinguishing the authority of the two
highest courts in South Africa). "Organs of [the] state ... [such as Parliament and the
Executive] must assist and protect the courts to ensure the independence, impartiality,
dignity, accessibilit, and effectiveness of the courts." Id. ch. 8, § 165(4).
15. Se geer ally S. XFR. CONST., 1996 (memorializing the framework for the new
South African governncnt); Our Constitution, PARLIAMLNT OF THE RLP. OF S. AFR.,
http://wmy.parliamenL.gov.za/coien.phlp?(aLtgoryID=11 (last visited Nov. 2, 2011)
(describing the "transition from apartheid rule to democracy").
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fundamental rights.16 The South African Bill of Rights received
international praise for two main reasons.1  First, it affirms the
idea of equality for all in post-apartheid South Africa. 8 Second,
the Bill of Rights extends beyond traditional civil and political
rights to protect second and third generation rights.'9 These
rights include: the right to have the environment protected for
future generations; health care, food, water, and social security;
children's rights; education; and access to information.2
The framers of the South African Constitution took steps to
ensure that future governments would recognize these
protected fundamental rights2 The framers identified certain
non-derogable rights such as equality, human dignity, and life.22
The Bill of Rights creates a private right of action for
infringement or threat to a protected right.23 Demonstrating the
16. See S. AFR. CONST., 1996. ch. 2 (protecting the listed fundamental rights); see
also David Kgosimore, The Bill ofRights in the Constitution oj the Republic oj South Africa
and Its Application Within the Criminal justice System, CRIME RESEARCH IN S. AFR. (2000),
http://www.crisa.org.za/volumel/rights.htm (discussing the impact of the Bill of
Rights).
17. See Our Constitution, supra note 15 (noting the positive changes introduced by
the Bill of Rights): Kgosimore, supra note 16 (acknowledging the constitution's
reputation as "the most liberal in the world").
18. See generally S. AFR. CONST., 1996, ch. 2 (representing both a symbolic and
actual transition of great significance); but cf Kgosimore, supra note 16, at 3-5 (arguing
that in practice, the constitution falls short of equal protection for all).
19. See generally S. AFR. CONST., 1996, ch. 2 (guaranteeing protection of a series of
fundamental rights): but o. Kgosimore, supra note 16, at 1, 3-5 (positing that Bill of
Rights protections have slighted crime victims). Second generation rights are socio-
cconomic, while rights of the third generation are "collective," and often global in
nature, such as the right to a healthy environment. See Frans Viljoen. International
Human Rights Law: A Short History, UN CHRONICLE (jan. 1, 2009), http://www.un.org/
wcm/content/sitechironicle/home/archive/issues2OO9/wciustdisarmii/interinational
humanrightslawashor-thistory (defining the three generations of human rights).
20. See S. AFR. CONST., 1996, ch. 2, § 24, 27-29, 32 (protecting a series of
fundamental rights).
21. See, e.g., id. ch. 2. § 37 (enumerating a seies of non-derogable rights); id.
ch. 2, § 38 (creating a right of action to enforce a protected right).
22. See id. ch. 2. § 36-37 (discussing the non-derogable rights). Protected rights
may be limited only to the extent of what is "reasonable and justifiable ... based on
human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account . . . a) the nature of the
right; b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; c) the nature and extent of
the limitation; d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and c) less
restrictive means to achieve the purpose." Id. ch. 2, § 36.
23. See id. ch. 2, § 38 (identifying five types of peoplc who may approach the
court: "a) anyone acting in their own interest; b) anyone acting on behalf of another
person who cannot act in their own name; c) anyone acting as a member of, or in the
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importance of these protected rights, the parliamentary
committee report on the DNA Bill emphasized the rights
applicable to the DNA Bill.2 4
The African National Congress ("ANC") dominates the
political landscape of the government." Since the inception of
the new government, the ANC has controlled the executive
branch, from the first President Nelson Mandela to current
President Jacob Zuma.2b The party similarly controls the
legislature, holding 264 seats within the National Assembly, or
sixty-six percent of all seats, just one seat short of a decisive two-
thirds majority.2
ANC prominence in South African government has
transformed the political environment into a "de facto one-party
system."28 The party has in the past held a powerful two-thirds
"decisive majority," giving it the power to unilaterally change
interest of, a group or class of persons; d) anyone acting in the public interest; and e)
an association acting in the interest of its incinbers").
24. See PORTFOLTO COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 7, at 40-41 (identifying
provisions froin the Bill of Rights pertinent to the DNA Bill: human dignity (Section
10); privacy (Section 14); equality (Section 9); bodily and physical integrity (Section
12(2)(b)); the rights of arrested, detained and accused persons (Section 35);
limitations of rights (section 36); and the rights of children (section 28)).
25. See What Is the African National Congress?, AFR. NAT'L CONG.,
http://wwTv.anc.org.za/showv.php~id= 172 (last visited Nov. 5, 2011) (describing that
eight decades after its founding in 1912, the Arican National Congress achieved a
breakthrough in the 1994 clections, when it received a mandate to construct a new
constitution, which was adopted in 1996); Members ofParliament, ANC PARLIAMENTARY
CAUCUS, http:w//Nwy.anc.org.za/caucus/nps.php (last visited Nov. 5, 2011)
(recognizing the ANC parliamentary majority).
26. Arnold Wehnhoerner, Zanafication oJ South Africa's ANC?, FOUND. FOR EUR.
PROGRESSIVT STUD. 3 (2012), http:,// wy.feps-europe.eu/uploads/documents/
20120510-zanufication-of-AN(-wchihociier.pdf (listing the four ANC presidents, also
including Thabo Mbeki and Kgalena Motlanthe).
27. See Sebastion Berger, South Africa Election: ANC's 2/3 Majority tuder Threat,
TLLLGRAPH (Apr. 23, 2009, 10:26 AM). http: //mwtelegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/
africaandindianocean /southafrica/ 5206 189 /South-Africa-elec tion-AN( s-two-thirds-
Imlajority-under-threat.htmli (explaining the significance of the two-thirds majority);
Members of Parliament, supra note 25 (documenting the number of current ANC seats in
the National Assembly and the National Council of provinces).
28. Valely Ferim, Flaws in Africa's Doninant One-Party Democracies: The Case of
Cameroon and South Africa 4 CAILROON J. ON DLMCRACY & H.R. 28, 34 (2010) (Citing
evidence that "people continue to vote for the ANC because of the lack of a credible
alternative party"); Giovanni M. Carbone, Political Parties and Party Systems in Africa:
Themes and Research Perspectives, 3 WORLD POL. SCi. R. 1. 9 (2007) (identifying the
"liberation factor" as a key reason for continued public support of the ANC).
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the Constitution . Even without possession of the super
majority, "there is a widespread perception that high-level
corruption has become more overt and blatant under President
Jacob Zuma" than during the Mbeki administration.so
Despite numerous well-documented successes in the
transition to a democratic government, South Africa still faces
the tall task of lessening "the harsh legacies of a century of
segregation and apartheid."-, Racial tensions still exist in daily
life and play a role in everyday social interaction. Apartheid's
impact manifests itself in prominent feelings of public mistrust
and animosity toward the State. Stig Gezelius and Maria
Hauck, authors of a study on compliance with state regulation as
it pertains to world fisheries, assert that nation-building in South
Africa depends on "redressing historical disparities" between
racial groups "while simultaneously facilitating a single national
29. Berger, supra note 27 (reporting the occurrence of this decisive majorit,
though conceding that the ANC has never actually exercised it to unilaterally change
the Constitution). But see thnit 8: Building Democraq After Apartheid. S. AFR.:
OVERCOMING APARTHFiD, http://overcorningapartheid.nmsu.edi/iinit.php~id= 16 (last
visited Oct. 13. 2012) [hereinafter Building Democraq] (speculating that democracy is
exercised uncasily in South Africa due to ANC "ectoral domination" and that there
are dangers of a "dominant party system," citing former President Thabo Mbeki's
desire to expand executive power).
30. South Africa: The Culture of Corruption and Intolerance in the ANC, ALLAFRICA
July 26, 2012), http://allafrica.com/ storie s/201207260987. html (discussing the
"scourge of corruption" that "has derailed the realization of [ANC] ideals"); see also
UN RLPORT, supra note 10, at 95. 107, 114 (reporting increasing corruption in South
Africa).
31. Building Democray. supra note 29 (contemplating the successes of South Arica
since the end of apartheid, but also identifying the remaining problems: economic
inequality, homelessness, violent crime, and a health crisis mainly caused by
HIV/AIDS); see also James L. Gibson & Christopher Claassen, Racial Reconciliation in
South Afica: Interracial Contact and Changes Over Time, 66.J. SOC. ISSUEs 255, 271 (2010)
(discussing ra ial tensions that remain in South Africa as a result of apartheid).
32. See Gibson & Claassen, supra note 31 (recognizing the impact that contact
between racial groups has on racial reconciliation, but positing that consciousness of
group identity correlates to increased prejudice and racial tension toward other
groups); Stig S. Gezelius & Maria Hauck, Toward a Theory of Compliance in State-Regulated
Livelihoods: A Comparative Study of Compliance Motivations in Developed and Developing
World Fisheries, 45 L Xw & SOC'Y RFV. 435, 457 (2011) (describing the existence of
lingering negative feelings caused by apartheid).
33. See Gezelius & Hauck, supra note 32 (discussing the phenomenon by which
these negative feelings toward the government have caused new laws to be met with
suspicion and have contributed to the absence of the lkgislature's authority); Gibson &
Claassen, supra note 31 and accompanying text (analyzing effects of these negative
feelings toward the state).
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identity."34 Arguably, South Africa has a long road ahead to
reconcile these social tensions..
Corruption by high-ranking and influential officials has
stunted the reconciliation process between the people and the
government@ A 2003 report by the United Nations Office of
Drugs and Crime ("UN Report") suggests that corruption in
South Africa is a function of both a broken system and a
sociological phenomenon of acceptance." The UN Report cites
poverty as a reason for widespread corruption.38 Further, the UN
Report specifically points to the media's influence, to which
some attribute the tendency to blame the person who accepts
the bribe and not the one who gives it. " Prosecutors capitalize
on this bias, often using the person who gave the bribe as a
witness against the official who accepted it."11 Though corruption
was a major problem under the apartheid government, the
public perception is that it has expanded further since the end
of apartheid in 1994.41
34. Gezelius & Hauck, supra note 32. at 460-61 (characterizing the national
identity as a "complicated manner," and noting that in the two decades since apartheid
ended, the nation has transitioned from a "complkx legal system of racism" to
constitutional democracy." (citing Kiistina Benticy & Adam Habib. Racial Redress,
National Identity and Citizenship in Post-Apartheid South Africa, in RACIAL REDRFSS ANT)
CITIZFNSHIP (A. Habib & K. Bentley, eds. 2008)); see also S. AFR. CONST, 1996, ch. 1
(initiating this transition).
35. See Gezelius & Hauck, supra note 32, at 460-61 (contemplating the long-term
effects of racial tension on the efficiency of government): Building Democracy, supra
note 29 and accompanying text (identifying areas where South Arica can improve
itself).
36. See Gezelius & Hauck, supra note 32, at 457-59 (drawing the connection
between corruption and stifled reconciliation between the people and government);
UIN REPORT supra note 10, at 95, 107, 114, (painting a picture of increasing corruption
in South Arica). The UN Report states that 13.3% of citizens living in Johannesburg
reported experiencing corruption first hand at the city level, up from 7.6% in 1996 and
that the perceived level of corruption within the ANC increased between 1995 and
2000. See id. at 123.
37. See UN RLPORT, supra note 10, at 108 (suggesting that the South Arican
mindset toward corruption has been warped, the public view of corruption allows it to
be practiced. and the average South African views corruption as something condoned
rather than reported).
38. See id. at 108-09 (analyzing social causes of widespread corruption in South
Arica).
39. See id. (describing the hypocritical notion that giving a bribe is doing business,
while accepting a bribe is criminal).
40. See id. (demonstrating the impact of the media's bias in reporting on bribery).
41. Margot Rubin, Perceptions of Corruption in the South African Housing Allocation
and Delivery Progranme: What It Alay Meanfor Accessing the State, 46.j. ASIAN & AFR. STUD.
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B. The DNA Bill
The DNA Bill establishes the National DNA Database of
South Africa ("NDDSA") and outlines database maintenance
procedures for the South African Police Service ("SAPS").4
Section 15M authorizes a limited core of officials who may
conduct DNA searches within the database and with whom
analysts may share their findings. Section 150 outlines a
quality management system and guidelines for retention,
storage, and destruction of samples in the database. 44 Section
15P establishes a penalty of a fine or up to fifteen years
imprisonment for any party who misuses the database. 45
Section 15Q requires the National Commissioner to issue
instructions to carry out various aspects of the DNA program.46
This provision addresses: 1) law enforcement procedures for
sample collection, database maintenance, and use; 2) training
courses to teach law enforcement officials proper procedures;
and 3) development of information technology to facilitate
database growth and efficient use of its contents.4 7 Pursuant to
Section 15S, the National Commissioner must submit to
479, 483 (reporting that a 2010 survey rated South Arica as the fifty-fourith most
corrupt nation out of 178 surveyed and citing a Public Services Commission Report
which stated that "bribery, fraud, nepotism, and systematic corruption are common
forms of corruption in contemporary South Mrica"); see also, UN RLEPORT supra note 10,
at 98 (reporting the perception that corruption has increased, and that statistics for
serious crime support this belief).
42. See Criminal Law (Forensic Procedures) Amendment Bill, 2008. Bill 15F7-G
(S. Mr.) (outlining the composition of the database in terms of a crime scene index,
reference index, convicted offenders index, and volunteer index, among others).
43. See id. § 15M (designating the National Commissioner as the appropriate
authority to conduct the DNA search and listing the law enforcement officials
privileged to DNA analysis results).
44. See id. § 150 (setting baseline provisions for the quality control and
maintenance of the DNA database).
45. See id. § 15P (creating stiff penalties to protect agamnst improper database use).
46. See id. § 15Q (listing the matters involved in the building and maintenance of
the database for which the National Commissioner wvill issue further instructions).
47. See id. § 15Q (detailing the procedures to be implemented); see also Vivian
Attwood, Bill for DNA Database. IOL NLWS (Jan. 16, 2009, 12:52 PM),
http://wwv.iol.co.za/nevs/south-africa/bill-for-national-dna-database-1.431348
(describing the procedure for sample collection: "Samples will be taken at the time of
arrest. Each time a crime is committed, unknown samples gathered from the scene will
be matched against those of known origin").
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Parliament an annual report on NDDSA operations and any
additional reports that Parliament may request.48
South African DNA legislation will not require the
construction of a program from scratch.49 Substantial
components of a national database already exist and have been
used in South Africa for years.5o South Africa uses DNA in other
areas, such as to trace illegal rhinoceros horns and to maintain a
database for the endangered cycad plant.51 yet, the expansion of
DNA use for criminal investigation in South Africa has been
significantly hindered in recent years by the current rules
applied to DNA forensics.5 The Criminal Procedure Act of 1977
("1977 Act"), designed to apply to blood sampling, does not
suffice to govern an entire DNA program.53
48. See Criminal Law (Forensic Procedures) Amendment Bill, 2008. Bill 15S
(S. Mr.) (delegating to the National Commissioner the responsibility of reporting to
Parliament).
49. See Helen Bamford, Parly Team Embarks on DNA Database Fact-Finding Mission,
STAR (S. Mr.), June 18, 2011, at 8 (pointing out that South Africa currently has a I)NA
database containing 123,000 DNA profiles); LYNCH & HANCOCK, supra note 7, at 33
(observing that in the absence of DNA legislation, courts have applied Section 37 of the
Criminal Procedure Act of 1977).
50. See Bamford, supra note 49 (identifying components of a futuire DNA progriam
that alrcady exist); Andrew Faull. Forensic Science and the Future ofPolicing in South Africa,
ISS ToDAY (Feb. 21, 2011), http:/,/vw.issafrica.org/iss_today.phpIl)= 1235
(describing the capacity of a robotic DNA analyses facility in South Africa to analyze
800 DNA samples every day).
51. See Zani Magagula, South Africa: Technology Catches Up with Rhino Poachers,
ALlAFRICA (Feb. 1, 2011), http://allafrica.com/stories/201102011146.html (lauding
the advent of rhinoceros DNA sampling to aid prosecutors in tracking down suspects in
possession of horns and to link a horn to its carcass); Erin Conway-Smith, South Africa
Protects Endangered Cycads: Beautijul Plants from the Time of the Dinosaurs Now Threatened
By Thieves. GLOBAL POST (May 30, 2010), http://www.globalpost.coi/dispatch/south-
africa/100305/south-africa-endangered-cycad (discussing a I)NA database for the
endangered and rare cycad plants, which in the past have been stolen, smuggled, and
trafficked across borders).
52. See Tanya Waterworth, Lobby to Cut Down on Rape: DNA Profiling Vital to Stopping
Repeat Offenders, Says Expert, INDEP. (S. Ar.), Nov. 27, 2010, at 9 (noting that "in South
Africa DN can only be taken via a full blood sample which must be drawn by a
medical practitioner"); ANDREW 1). THIBEDEAU, COUNCIL FOR RESPONSIBILE GENE TICS,
NATIONAL DN DATABASES 2011 143-46 (2011) (describing the limitations on the
taking and use ofDNA evidence under the Criminal Procedure Act of 1977).
53. PORTFOLIO COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 7, at 9 (explaining provisions of
the 1977 Act concerning blood sampling and the need for legislation to establish a
DNA database); THIBLDEAU, supra note 52, at 143-45 (Citing tie statutes that comprise
current South African I)NA law).
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Despite ongoing parliamentary scrutiny since January 2009,
the legislature is unlikely to ratify the DNA Bill in the near
future.54 Portfolio committees in Parliament process legislation
and oversee their designated government department.f The
portfolio committee on police ("Portfolio Committee") divided
the original version of the DNA Bill into two separate bills: one
for fingerprint collection and the other for the DNA database.56
Shortly thereafter, Parliament passed the fingerprint collection
and storage bill.57 In early 2011, the Portfolio Committee put the
DNA Bill on hiatus to prepare for a study tour to observe other
nations' procedures for maintaining a national database.5s
In its report ("Committee Report"), the Portfolio
Committee sought to understand "international best practices"
both in terms of scientific and technological advancement in
DNA analysis and legislation and policing advancements." The
Committee Report recognized the Cabinet's intent for the DNA
Bill to be an "integral part of the criminal justice system."'1o The
Portfolio Committee extended its time on the DNA Bill for two
reasons: first, its belief that the public should actively participate
in the process and second, to thoroughly study the legal
54. See Mabuza, supra note 9 ("Legislation making it possible to collect DNA
samples from suspects or convicted offenders is unlikely to be passed by Parliament any
time soon."); see also PORTFOLIO COMMITTEE RLPORT, supra note 7, at 40-44
(discussing factors that rnust be considered before passing the DNA Bill).
55. See Commttees., PARIAMENT OF THE REP. OF S. AFR. (Sept. 3, 2012),
http://www.parliament.gov.za/livc/tontentpopup.php?ltemID=35 (defining the role
and functions of portfolio committees).
56. Mabuza, supra note 9 (noting the separation of the bill into two parts); see also
Crime- Fighting Tool, supra note 8 (providing a history of the DINA Bill).
57. Mabua, supra note 9 (documenting the DNA Bill's delay in Parliament); see
also Crime-ighting Tool, supra note 8 (acknowledging that as of September 2010, the
passage of the fingerprint bill had alrcady resulted in the collection of about five
million new fingerprints by the South African Police Force ("SAPF")).
58. See Mabuza, supra note 9 (quoting Diane Kohler Barnard, a member of the
Portfolio Cominittec, who justified the study tour because the committee members
"need to speak from an informed perspective"); see generally PORTFOI10 COMMIT TEE
RLPORT, supra note 7 (describing the committee's findings and recommendations from
its study tour).
59. PORTFOTITO COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 7, at 4-5 (outlining the objectives
for the study tour).
60. Id. at 5-6 (demnonstrating the significance with which the executive branch
views the DNA Bill).
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challenges to DNA sampling faced by other nations.61 The
Portfolio Committee viewed the DNA Bill as a "priority" and "a
matter of urgency," yet wanted to devote extra time to the bill's
important issues. 2
C. The Benefits of a DNA Database
In the mid-1980's, UK police became the first to use DNA
profiling. The world soon discovered several benefits from
DNA databases: the ability to identify missing persons or
unidentified human remains; use as an investigation tool for
criminal intelligence; aid for the identification of persons
alleged to have committed offenses; and evidence to be used in
proving the innocence or guilt of accused persons in a court of
law.64 Before 2008, officials compared collected DNA samples to
database samples on an ad hoc basis.65 With the latest
technological developments demonstrating the potential of
DNA forensics, South African legislators gave new impetus to the
development of a legislative framework for DNA analysis.66
Proponents of the DNA Bill view this as an opportunity to
use DNA forensics as part of an initiative to reduce the high
crime rate.67 Many criminals in South Africa are repeat
61. See id. (discussing the commlittCe's interest in public hearings and a study
tour).
62. Id. at 4 (explaining the Portfolio Committee's dilemma).
63. See Forensic DNA Crimeline, DNA PROJECT: FIGHTING CRIME WITH SCIENCE,
http://www dnaproject.co.za/content/content.php-type=article&section=20&id= 13
(last visited Nov. 25. 2012) (recalling a 1988 case in which police linked one man to two
separate rape and murders in order to exonerate another man who had confessed);
LYNCH & HANCOCK, supra note 7, at 5 (summarizing the 1988 case).
64. See, e.g., LYNCH & HANCOCK, supra note 7 at 4, 16 (detailing anecdotes where
DNA evidence served these purposes); Maya Shwayder, To Catch a Killer: Examining the
Policy Implications of Genomics, HARV. GAZETTE, Feb. 17, 2011, available at http://news.
harvard.cdu/gazette/story/2011/02/to-catch-a-killer (documenting the process by
which the Los Angeles Police Department used DNA analysis to solve the "Grim
Sleeper" murder case).
65. See PORTF01LTO COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 7, at 8 (describing the status of
the DNA program without legislation).
66. See id. (citing improvements to DNA technology during the 1990s); see also
Faull, supra note 50 (describing the 2006 opening of the world's first fully automated
robotic DNA analyses facility in South Arica).
67. See, e.g:, Waterworth, supra note 52, at 9 (asserting that a DNA database would
aid the fight against cime in South Africa); see also Palash R. Ghosh, South Africa:
Mlurder Rate High, But Dropping, INT'L BLS. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2011),
http://wwv.ibtirnes.con/articles./232544/20111017/south-africa-crine-nurder-irates-
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offenders, and keeping evidence to convict them on the second
or third offense may enable law enforcement to prevent
unchecked crime sprees.68 DNA evidence can also speed up
trials because many defendants admit guilt when confronted
with DNA evidence.69
The DNA Bill can serve as part of a broad movement to
reduce the high crime rate in South Africa.7 o Currently,
approximately 50 murders and 200 rapes occur every day.71 Such
crimes are often caused by repeat offenders who could be
convicted with DNA evidence.7 2 In the absence of standardized
DNA procedures, the criminal justice system often does not hold
criminals accountable for their misdeeds." Additionally, the
dearth of standardized DNA procedures due to the
poli ce-townships-c ourts-jails-drugs-gangs-apartheid. htn (noting the South African
murder rate has declined since 1994, yet still is 4.5 times the global average).
68. See Waterworth, supra note 52 (citing Dr. Carolyn Hancock's statement that
"South Arica has one of the highest rates of repeat criminal offenders in the world,
with ninety percent of rapists likely to be repeat offenders"): Mabuza, supra note 9
(citing the statement of researcher Andrew Faull, of the Institute for Security Studies,
that a small percentage of offenders account for a large percentage of all crimes).
69. See'Wateriorth, supra note 52, at 9 (noting that the presence of DNA evidence
makes an admission of guilt more likely); Gill Gifford, No Place to Hide for Crminals,
STAR (S. Afr.), Dec. 18, 2008 (citing justice Ministry spokesperson Zolile Ngayi
prediction for an increase in plea deals caused by prosecutorial use of fingerprint and
DNA evidence).
70. See PORTFOL TO COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 7, at 9-10 (stating that a DNA
program should be part of a broad movement, along with other elements such as
training police to have thorough investigative skills).
71. See Waterworith, supra note 52 and accompanying text (estimating the number
of rapes at two hundred per day but insinuating that a significant number of rapes go
unreported); Chris Asplen, Girls Pay Price as Politicians Sit on Law 1Which Would Establish
DNA Database, INDEP. (S. Ar.), june 18, 2011, at 7 (criticizing politicians for sacrificing
lives by failing to pass the DNA Bill).
72. See Attwood, supra note 47 (asserting that South Africa "ha[s] the highest rate
of recidivism in the world. Most criminals don't commit just a single crime; they repeat
their criminal activities over and over again"); LYNCH & HANCOCK, supra note 7, at 20
(stating that fifty-two percent of all criminals commit a second offense within six years
of their initial arrest).
73. See Ghosh, supra note 67 (Citing Dr. Johan Burger, senior researcher at the
Crime and justice Program Institute for Security Studies in Pretoria, South Africa, who
estimated that only about twenty-seven percent of murders in South Africa are solved
and fourteen percent lcad to convictions); Asplen, supra note 71 (expressing dismay
over the lack of criminal accountability).
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nonexistence of DNA legislation risks irreparable damage to
sensitive crime scene evidence in criminal investigations.
Beyond the opportunity for the DNA Bill to quell
recidivism, additional factors weigh on the Portfolio
Committee's decision-making.5 For instance, South Africa's
DNA profile backlog continues to balloon.76 The Portfolio
Committee also must consider the bill's threat to personal
liberties, an aspect upon which bill dissenters have seized.
Members of the Portfolio Committee have expressed their
desire to stall the DNA Bill until they fully understand the
problems nations with DNA legislation have encountered.
74. See NAT'L CRIM.JLSTICE RE. SERV.. UNDERSTANDING DNA EVIDENCE: A GUIDE
FOR VICTIM SERVICE PROVIDERS 4 (2001) (describing the threat of environmental
contaminants, such as DNA from another source or bacteria, caused by heat and
humidity); Nduru, supra note 1 (emphasizing Vanessa Lynch's belief that if South
Africa had an effective DNA program in place at the time of her father's murder, the
gang that killed her father could have been arrested and possibly linked to other
crimes in the arca); DNA PROJECT, DNA CSIS: FIGHTING CRIME WITH SCIENCE 6-12
(2009), available at http://www.histonbulis.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2011 /06/DNA-
(AL-WATERMARKc.pdf (identifying possible sources of contamination of DNA
evidence and the proper procedures to handle DNA evidence at a crime scene).
75. See Nduru, supra note I (noting the extensive backlog of DNA samples);
Karabo Keepile, DNA Proposal 'Will Violate Rights", MAIL & GUARDIAN ONLINE (Feb. 19,
2009). http://mg.co.za/artice/2009-02-19-dna-proposal-wxill-violate-rights
(summarizing the position of opponents to the DNA Bill).
76. See Nduru, supra note 1 (asserting that South Africa's enormous backlog
includes samples up to two year old, and implying that the small size of South Arica's
DNA database in comparison to that of the United Kingdom's should be particularly
bothersome considering the high South Arican crime rate); LYNCH & HANCOCK, supra
note 7, at 46 (recognizing the problem of the increasing number of unanalyzed DNA
samples).
77. See Keepile, supra note 75 (quoting the South Arican Human Rights
Commission, which said that "A person should not necessarily have a reduced
expectation of privacy just by virtue of being arrested, as that would run contrary to the
principle of the presumption of innocence"); LYNCH & HANCOCK, supra note 7, at 34
(recognizing the rol of civil liberties in cautiousness toward the DINA Bill).
78. See supra note 58 and accompanying text (summarizing the desire of the
committee members to become fully educated about DNA legislation before passing
the DNA Bill); PORTFOLIO COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 7, at 5-6 (justifying the
delay of the DNA Bill). But see, Press Release, Inkatha Freedom Party, South Africa: IFP
Calls for Urgent Deliberation of DNA Bill (Aug. 28 2012), http://allafrica.com/
storics/201208290257.htiunl (calling Parliament's attention to the negative impact
caused by the DNA Bill's delay).
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II. THE ISSUES OF DNA LEGISLATION
Part 11 of this Note analyzes the issues pertaining to DNA
legislation. It explores the DNA program development in the
United Kingdom and United States to provide richer context for
the issues facing South Africa's DNA program. Part ILA
discusses the evolution of the DNA program in the United
Kingdom. Part II.B describes the issues the United States DNA
program has faced. Part II.C examines the factors causing the
delay of the DNA Bill in South Africa.
A. The Evolution of the British National DNA Database
Since the 1980s, the United Kingdom has been a world
leader in the development of DNA profiling, both in the
laboratory and the courtroom. The British National DNA
Database ("NDNAD") has grown substantially, accumulating
approximately five million profiles as of 2009, due to the DNA
Expansion Programme ("Expansion Programme"), an initiative
launched by the British government in April 2000.8 The British
government adopted the Expansion Programme pursuant to its
aspiration to compile DNA samples of all "known active
offend[ers] ."8' The enormously successful program exceeded its
objective in approximately five years." Two factors that
79. See Forensic DA4 Crimeline, supra note 63 (describing the history of DNA
forensics in the United Kingdom); LYNCH & HANCOCK, supra nOte 7 at 5, 26
(documenting the first high-profile DNA conviction in 1988 and the establishment of
the world's first DNA database in 1995). See also S & Marper v. United Kingdom, App.
Nos. 30562/04 & 30566/04, 48 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1169, 1174 (2009) (holding that the
retention of DNA samples from a broad range of individuals, including both convicts
and the innocent, adults and youths, violated the "right to respect for private life").
80. See LYNCH & HANCOCK, supra note 7, at 27 (attributing numerous successes to
the Expansion Programme, including: enactment of DNA legislation; DNA awareness
training; and the quadrupling of DNA detections over a five-year period); Grahan
Arnold, A Presumption of Guilt: The Governments Response to S and Marper v UK, 58
STUDENT LAWI R. 12, 12 (2009) (stating that the British National DNA Database
"NDNAD" contains DNA samples from 5.2% of the population, a remarkable
proportion in comparison to the US database, which contains samplcs from just 0.5%
of the population).
81. Carole McCartney, The DNA Expansion Programme and Criminal Investigation, 46
BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY, 175, 176 (2006) (reflecting upon the breadth of the Expansion
Programme); see also IYNCH & HANCOCK, supra note 7, at 27-29 (discussing the far-
reaching benefits of the Expansion Progranine).
82. See McCartney, supra note 81 (documenting the success of the Expansion
Programme through a massive government financial commitment (UKE240.8 million),
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contributed to the rapid database growth are: 1) education,
training, and experience for law enforcement, and 2) legislative
reform and case law expanding authority for DNA collection.83
These changes improved the turnaround time for DNA analysis
from a year in 1997 to as fast as five days in 2001, yielding
exponential database growth. 4
The Expansion Programme also increased State authority
to encroach upon personal liberties.85 The Criminal Justice Act
of 2003 ("Criminal Justice Act") codified State authority to take
DNA samples, allowing an officer to take a non-intimate sample
such as a cheek swab "upon reasonable suspicion for an offence,
regardless of whether it will indicate guilt or have any possibility
of use during the investigation."8b Law enforcement used the
intelligence screen, a controversial DNA analysis method known
in the United States as the DNA dragnet, for which officials
gather and analyze DNA samples from all individuals in a local
area matching the description of a perpetrator at large. 7
After two decades of virtually unabated growth for the
NDNAD, the European Court of Human Rights ("ECtHR")
an increase in personnel (650 additional jobs), and the automation of the DNA
profiling processes); see also DN4 Expansion Progranme 2000-2005: Reporting
Achievement, HOME OFFICF (2006), http:,//vw ntjrs.gov/App/Publications/
abstract.aspxID=246661 (reporting the tremendous growth of the NDNAD resulting
from the Expansion Programme).
83. See supra note 81 and accompanying text (describing reasons for the success of
the Expansion Programme). The expanded power for DNA collection pertained to the
range of people from whom officials could take samples, the diminishing level of
authority required to rcquest a DNA sample, and permision for the indefinite sample
retention. See McCartney, supra note 81.
84. See upra note 81 and accompanying text (identifying the positive results from
the DNA Expansion Programnie).
85. See Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44 (U.K.) (expanding State authority to take
DNA samples); McCartney, supra note 81, at 177 (noting the expansion of State
authority).
86. Criminal Justice Act. 2003, c. 44 (U.K) (initiating nunerous changes in
criminal procedure, including the taking of non-intimate samples without consent);
McCartney, supra note 81, at 177 (describing the impact of the Cr iminal Justice Act).
87. See McCartney, supra note 81, at 179 (recognizing substantial criticism of the
mass screen method because it is prone to profiling and assumptions of guilt,
compelling individuals to prove their innocence by providing a non-matching DNA
sample); Ainold, supra note 80, at 13 (demonstrating that the NDNAD is prone to
racial profiling by citing the proportions of several racial populations included in the
database: twenty-sten percent of the entire black population, forty-two percent of the
black inale population, seventy-seven percent of young black men, nine percent of the
Asian population, and six percent of the white population).
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challenged British sample retention procedures in the 2008 case
of S and Marper v. The United Kingdom.88  In 2001, police
separately arrested Mr. S for robbery and Michael Marper for
harassment of his partner.," Upon arrest, officials collected DNA
samples and fingerprints.0o Following the dismissal of charges,
both Mr. S and Marper asked the police to destroy their
fingerprints and DNA samples.91 The police refused, and Mr. S
and Marper brought breach of privacy claims to the ECtHR
under Articles 8 and 34 of the Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.92
The Marper Court analyzed the British system for
"systematic and indefinite retention" of DNA materials from
persons acquitted or who otherwise had their charges
dropped.h The Court cited the Nuffield Council on Bioethics,
which identified sample retention as significantly more
troublesome than sample procurement.94 The Court voiced
concern with potential privacy issues, contemplating the invasive
process of familial searching through which authorities could
uncover previously unknown or concealed genetic
88. See generally S & Marper v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 30562/04 & 30566/04,
48 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1169, 1200 (2009) (concluding that through its "blanket and
indiscriminate" sample retention policy, the United Kingdom had "overstepped" the
acceptable level of power to take and retain DNA samples); see also DNA Database:
Campaigners Welcome Ruling that DNA-holding Breaches Human Rights. TELEGRAPH
(Dec. 04, 2008) [hereinafter DN4 Database Breaches Human Rights], (describing the
popular belief that the Mlarper Court properly found the indefinite NDNAD retention
procedures to violatc privacy rights of the innocent).
89. See S & Warper, 48 & Eur. H.R. Rep. at 1172. Mr. S was eleven years of age at
the time of his arrest, causing the court to take extra care to protect his rights under
the UN Convention on the Right of the Child. See id. at 1182.
90. See id. at 1172 (conveying the facts of the case).
91. See id. (claborating that authorities r eieved both individuals of their
charges-Mr. S due to an acquittal and Marper for reconciling with his partner-and
summarizing the struggle of Mr. S and Marper to remove their DNA from the
NDNAD).
92. See id. (describing the refusal to remove DNA from the NDNAD that lead Mr.
S and Marper to bring their cases to the European Court of Human Rights
("ECLHR")). The ECLHR consolidated the two cases. See id.
93. Id. at 1174-75. 1184-85 (discussing the challenged protocols).
94. See id. at 1179-80 (citing NUFFITELD COU NCII, ON BIOETHICS, THE FORENSIC
USL OF BIOINFORMATION: ETHICAL ISSULS (2007), available at http:/
www nuficildbiocthics.org/s itcs/dcfault/filcs/Thc%20foreinsic%/20usc%2of%
20bioinform ation%20-%20ethical%20issues.pdf.
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relationships.9 The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984
("PACE") originally required fingerprints or DNA samples
taken from an individual suspected of an offense to be destroyed
"as soon as practicable" if and when the person is no longer
suspected of committing the offense or "as soon as [the
fingerprints or samples] have fulfilled the purpose for which
they were taken."' The Court explained the changed standard
under the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, permitting
retention of fingerprints and samples "after they have fulfilled
the purposes for which they were taken . . .", so long as the
prolonged retention is "for purposes related to the prevention
or detection of crime, the investigation of an offence, or the
conduct of a prosecution . . . ." Following its discussion of
PACE, the Court turned to Article 8 of the European
Convention of Human Rights, which protects the right to
privacy9 8 The Court held that the indefinite retention of
samples from persons not convicted of crimes encroaches too
far upon the right to privacy guaranteed in Article 8.9
Human rights activists applauded the Marper decision,
claiming it ushered the DNA movement away from the blanket
retention policy for profiles of all arrestees regardless of
innocence. 00 Parliament issued its response to Marper with the
95. See id. (referencing a host of ethical and logistical issues arising from DNA
retention): see also id. at 1186-87 (noting that the National Council for (jvil Liberties
and Privacy International each made submissions to the Court, highlighting the privacy
issue caused by retention of highly sensitive DNA information).
96. Id. at 1174-75 (summarizing the effect of PA(E fingerprint collection).
97. Id. at 1174 (citing the shift in retention policy)
98. See id. at 1187 (Citing Article 8); European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4. 1950. 213 U.N.T.S. 221,
[hereinafter ECHR], available at http://vy.iunhcr.org/reivorld/docid/
3ac6b3b04.htmIl. Ar ticle 9 of the ECHR states: "(1) Everyone has the right to respect
for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. (2) There shall be no
interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in
accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of
national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the
protection of the rights and frecdons of others."
99. See S & Marper, 48 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 1202 (rejecting the existing DNA
retention policy).
100. See DNA Database Breaches Human Rights, supra note 88 (quoting Shain
Chakrabarti, director of Liberty who said tha[ S & Marper "is one of the most strongly
worded judgments that Liberty has ever seen from the Court of Human Rights."); see
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Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 ("2012 Act").101 The 2012 Act
provides for sample destruction within six months, and caps
arrestee profile retention at three years.102
B. DNA as Evidence and the DNA Database in the United States
In the late 1980s, the US government created the
Combined DNA Index System ("CODIS"), a compilation of
national, state, and local DNA databases accessible to law
enforcement agencies. 0 Laboratories from around the country
can access the national collection of DNA samples, known as the
National DNA Index System ("NDIS") to conduct
comprehensive DNA searches.104 As of July 2012, the NDIS
contained nearly 10 million offender profiles, 1.2 million
arrestee profiles, and 450,000 forensic profiles.1015
Courtroom acceptance of DNA evidence has evolved since
DNA evidence emerged in the late 1980s. Originally, very few
cases even questioned DNA admissibility.1o Courts relied on the
also LYNCH & HANCOCK, supra note 7 at 29 (discussing the important changes to the
retention framework).
101. See grally Protection of Freedoms Act, 2012, c. 9, part 1, c. I (U.K.)
(reducing the scope of DNA retention); PORTFOLIO COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 7,
at 33 (describing the legislative response to Marper).
102. See Protection of Freedoms Act, 2012, c. 9, part 1, c. 1, §3, 14 (U.K.)
(outlining specific protocols for the retention and destruction of fingerprints, DNA,
and similar types of samples).
103. See LYNCH & HANCOCK, supra note 7, at 30 (describing the composition of
the CODIS in terms of its two main indexes: the Convicted Offender Index, containing
the DNA profiles of individuals convicted of certain types of crimes, and the Forensic
Index, containing DNA profiles obtained from crime scene evidence); Brandon L.
Garrett, DNA and Due Process, 78 FORDHAM L REV. 2919, 2931-32 (2010) (discussing
the emergence of Combined DNA Index System ("CODIS") as an important
development in modern DNA testing).
104. See supra note 103 and accompanying text (explaining the framework for the
US DNA database).
105. See CODIS-NDIS Statistics, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
http: /wwwfbi.govs/about-us/lab/codis/ndis-statistics (last visited Sept. 1, 2012)
(reporting that CODIS has produced over 185,000 hits).
106. See Dan Krane & William Thompson, Chapter 11: DA in the Courtroom in
PSYCHOLOGICAL & SCIENTIIC EVIDENCL IN CRIMINAL TRIALS, § 11:44 (2003) (providing
three reasons for the American justice system's initial unquestioning acceptance of
DNA evidence: 1) lack of awareness of the potential problems with DNA testing; 2)
standard defenses to DNA analysis had not yet emerged; and 3) private laboratories
conducting most early DNA work did not openly share their data). But see Dist. AL'y
Ofice v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308 (2009) (embracing the advent of DNA evidence into
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"general acceptance" standard, which dated back to the 1923
case Frye v. United States.o7 Judge Josiah Van Orsdel of the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
wrote that to be admissible at trial, scientific evidence "must be
sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance" in its
field. 0  In 1975, Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence
codified guidelines concerning the admission of scientific or
technical information for courts in civil and criminal
litigation.o9 The Supreme Court clarified Rule 702 and
superseded Fye in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.Io
Daubert held that the Frve standard was not necessary to admit
scientific evidence."' Daubert vested power in the judge to assess,
based on relevance and reliability, the validity of the scientific
reasoning presented at trial."1 In Kumho Tire v. Carmuchael, the
Supreme Court expanded the Daubert test to apply to
technology and other areas of specialized knowledge." 3
criminal law, the Supreme Court nevertheless cautiously chose to avoid creating a
broad liberty interest to post-conviction DNA testing).
107. Fryc v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (disallowing the
admission of evidence from the new and relatively untested polygraph machine); see
also Christopher Lach & Thomas Iatsis, DNA Fingerprinting 23 (Jan. 11, 2006)
(unpublished project report, Worcester Polytechnic Institute), available at http://
www.wpi.cdu/Pubs/E-project/Availabic/E-project-011306-130417/unrestricted/
IQI.pdf (recognizing Frye as the "golden standard" for the admission of new technical
evidence into the courtroom).
108. 1rye, 293 F. at 1014.
109. See joseph Ferraro & jacqueline M. Vernon, Federal Rules oj Evidence
Amendments: Will Proposed Changes to 701, 702, Narrow Gate to Expert Testimony in Patent
Trials?, 224 N.Y.L.J. S4, S4 (2000) (documenting the 1975 adoption of Federal Rule of
Evidence 702, "designed to liberalize the admission of scientific and technical
evidence"); see also FED. R. EvI). 702 (permitting an expert witness to present
"scientific. technical, or other specialized knowledge ... if (1) the testimony is based
upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and
methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the
facts of the case")
110. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589, 597
(1993) (establishing the new standard for scientific evidence); see also Joseph T. Walsh,
Keeping the Gate: The Evolving Role of the judicialy in Admitting Scientific Evidence 83
jU DICATURE 140, 140 (1999) (identifying the Daubert dec ision as a watershed event for
the admission of scientific evidence).
111. See Daubert 509 U.S. at 596-97.
112. See id.
113. 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999). See Walsh, supra note 110, at 142 (characterizing
Kurnho Tire as the Court's decision to champion the discretionary role of the trial judge
as the "gatekeeper" for evidence).
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Beyond the developments to the Federal Rules of Evidence,
legislators have codified the role of DNA through both state and
federal statutes.1 14 The federal statute, comprised primarily of
the DNA Identification Act of 1994, gives the Director of the FBI
the power to establish a database consisting of DNA profiles
from the convicted and the indicted along with other samples
collected with proper legal authority.115 The statute outlines
necessary credentials for any laboratory that conducts DNA
analysis for the database, and requires the laboratory to undergo
a biannual external audit." It enumerates permissible reasons
for DNA information disclosure and expressly limits the power
of individuals with access to such information."'7 The statute
requires the Director of the FBI to "promptly expunge" DNA
information in the database for any convicted or charged
individual who receives a final court order overturning or
dismissing all charges.'"," Many states follow a model similar to
the federal statute. '
DNA evidence in the United States commands particular
attention in the context of death penalty cases.1 20 Statistics
showing a trend of false convictions in capital cases demonstrate
114. See 42 U.S.C. § 14132 (2006) (outlining rules for the establishment and
maintenance of the national DNA database); see, e.g, N.Y. EXFC. LAW 995-c
(McKinney 2010) (establishing procedural rules concerning New York's computerized
DNA identification index).
115. See 42 U.S.C. 14132(a) (permitting reLtntion of analyses of DNA samplcs
recovered from crime scenes, recovered from unidentified human remains, and
voluntarily contributed from relatives of missing persons). The statute contains a caveat
that those DNA samples submitted for the purpose of climinating an individual from
an invcstigation arc not included in the NDIS. Id.
i16. See id. § 14132(b) (regulating the necessary credentials for laboratories with
access).
117. See id. 14132(b)-(c) (restricting access to database information).
118. See id. § 14132(d) (emphasizing the important expungement procedure).
119. See, e.g., N.Y. EXEC. LA x § 995-c (McKinney 2010) (outlining New York State
DNA procedures); FLA. STAT. § 943.325 (2012) (amending state DNA lcgislation passed
between 2000 to 2009).
120. See Annc-Maric Moyes, Assessing the Risk of Executing the knocent: A Case for
Allowing Access to Physical Evidence for Posthumous DNA Testing, 55 VAND. L. RLV. 953.
990-92 (2002) (quoting Supreme Court justice Sandra Day O'Connor who in 200 1,
amidst the exoneration of a flurry of death row inmates due to DNA evidence,
conceded that "the system may well be allowing some innocent defendants to be
executed"); Greta Proctor, Reevaluating Capital Punishment: The Fallacy of a Foolprooj
System, the Focus on Reform, and the International Factor. 42 GONZ. L. RLV. 211. 234-33,
nn.121-22 (2007) (stressing the need for a higher standard of cvidentiary proof in
capital cases).
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the importance of evidence that can more conclusively prove
innocence or guilt.121 Former US Supreme Court Justice Harry
Blackmun, referencing the risk of putting the innocent to death,
questioned whether the justice system should engage in capital
punishment at all.1 This risk of putting an innocent man or
woman to death has caused the American justice system to
contemplate the need for evidence which more conclusively
proves guilt.12s
One important component of the US DNA movement is
the legal work of the Innocence Project, a student clinic at the
Cardozo School of Law. 12A non-profit organization created in
1992 by Barry Schreck and Peter Neufeld, the Innocence Project
attempts to use DNA evidence to exonerate the wrongfully
convicted. 25 Collaboration between the Innocence Project and
legislators produced the Justice for All Act of 2004 ("Justice for
121. See Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. RLV. 55. 91-92
(2008) (commenting that "[fialse capital cornvictions are of particular salience to the
administration of the death penalty" and noting that most capital cases are reversed on
appeal or post-convicion. with seven percent of defendants with an overturned
sentence completely exonerated from the capital crime at the retrial); see also Proctor,
supra note 115, at 234 n.121 (referencing a 1992 study identifying twenty-thire specific
instances in which the United States likely put an innocent man to death).
122. See Proctor, supra note 115, at 236 (quoting Blackmun's 1994 concession that
he would no longer tinker with the procedures for capital punishment after twenty
years spent trying and failing to develop rules to "accurately and consistently determine
which defendants 'deserve' to die").
123. See Proctor, supra note 115, at 238-39 (referencing a bill proposed by former
Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney, rcinstating the death penalty in Massachusetts
by using modern forensics to instill a new heightened standard for capital punishment,
changing the traditional "beyond a reasonable doubt" to a "beyond all doubt" or
"absolute proof standard in order to address concerns about putting the innocent to
death); supra notes 115-22 and accompanying text (documenting the development of
US death penalty law).
124. See About the nocence Project, INNOCLNCE PROJLCT,
http://www innocenceproject.org/about (last visited Oct. 19, 2012) (identifying the
Innocence Project objectives to exoncrate the wrongfully convicted with DNA evidence
and to reform the criminal justice system to prevent further injustice); Samuel R. Gross
& Michael Shaffer, EXONERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 1989-2012: REPORT BY THF
NATIONAL RLGISTRY OF EXONLRATIONS 33 (2012), available at http://globahlong.files.
wordpress.com/2012/05/cxoncrations-us_1989_2012_full_report.pdf (noting the
correlation between the high number of exonerations in Illinois and New York and
active innocence projects in those states).
125. See supra note 124 and accompanying text (explaining the background of the
Innocence Project).
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All Act"), which created a series of grants for programs that
expand DNA use.12
Since its inception, the US DNA initiative has made
significant progress.'2 The US DNA movement has produced
more than 280 post-conviction exonerations and the ratification
of DNA laws in all fifty states.128 The DNA movement prevailed
in Skinner v. Switzer, where the Supreme Court held that
prisoners can compel prosecutors to turn over DNA evidence
that may exonerate prisoners post-conviction.'29 Additionally,
some courts have identified a defendant's right to obtain DNA
evidence post-conviction pursuant to the constitutional right to
be released upon proof of actual innocence."s0 Despite this
progress, commentators suggest gaps still exist in DNA
legislation. 3I1
126. SeeJustice for AlI Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-405, 118 Stat. 2260 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Codc) (outlining the government's plan for
expansion of DNA use for criminal forensics); see also EAQs: How Much Does DNA Testing
Cost?, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http:/vw/w innocenceproject.org/Content/
How much does DNA tcstingcost.php (last visited Nov. 22, 2011) (demonstrating
the importance of the grant programs under the justice for All Act because DNA
testing costs over US$1,000 per test and the average Cost of testing for a case is
US$8,500).
127. See Wission Statement, INNOCENCE PROJECT,
http://wwwinnocenceprojecttorg/about/Mission-Statement.php (last visited Oct. 12.
2012) (summarizing this progress); Nina Morrison, US Supreme Court: Inmate Can Seek
DNA Testing, INNOCENCE BLOG (Mar. 8, 2011, 5:50 PM),
http: //www.innoccnteprojct.org/C ontent/USSuprenc_CouirtInmateCan Seek
DNATesting.php (documenting a Supreme Court victory for the DNA movement in
Skinner v. Switzer).
128. See Michelic Hibbert, DNA Databanks: Law Enforcement' Geatest Sureillance
Tool?, 34 PAL FORLST L. Rv. 767, 767 (1999) (exploring the rapid growth of DNA
legislation in the states throughout the American nation, identifying weaknesses in
state databanking laws concerning issues such as genetic privacy, and suggesting
policies that could remedy those weaknesses); Mission Statement, supra note 127 (noting
that seventeen of the exonerated individuals served time on death row).
129. See Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. CL. 1289, 1298-300 (2011) (establishing a claim
to compel DNA evidence distinct from a post-conviction Brady claim. which entitles a
defendant to all exculpatory evidence, because Brady evidence is by definition favorable
to the defendant, whereas DNA evidence may or may not be favorable to the
defendant); Morrison, supra note 127 (characterizing Skinner as a signal of the Court's
willingness to consider necessary change to incorporate DNA into the law).
130. Dist. Att'y Office V. Osborne, 129 S. CL. 2308 (2009) (suggesting that Such a
liberty may exist); Garrett, supra note 103, at 2938 (recognizing that all sides in Osborne
acknowledged the entitlement of a convict to DNA testing in "some circumstances"
under the Due Process Clausc)
131. See Hibbert, supra note 128 at 819-25 (recognizing areas for improvement in
the DNA programs among the states; Jonathan F. Will, Dk4 (is Property: Implications on
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US DNA program expansion has faced significant
opposition.2 The First and Ninth Circuits have contemplated
the long-term danger of affording the police dragnet power."
By definition, the DNA dragnet requires no probable cause or
reasonableness for searches and seizures and is therefore
difficult to reconcile with the Fourth Amendment.' 4
Documented cases of prosecutorial misconduct and
mishandling of evidence in the laboratory reflect the concerns
of these circuit courts.'
Ninth Circuit Chief Judge Alex Kozinski suggested in
dissent that there should be no expectation at all for DNA
privacy protection.1so Kozinski responded to criticism of
increased police powers by noting that DNA privacy concerns
resemble the concerns J. Edgar Hoover initially faced when he
the Constitutionality ofDN4 Dragnets, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 129, 129-30 (2003) (asserting
the need for a higher standard of constitutional protection for an individual's DNA).
132. See McCartney, supra note 81 and accompanying text (referencing criticism
of the DNA dragnet, a product of US DNA program expansion); 'Will, supra note 131,
at 130 (arguing that when the government seeks to deprive an individual of her DNA, a
standard of constitutional protection greater than that provided during a dragnet must
be provided).
133. See United States v. WeikerLt 504 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir. 2007) (noting that DINA
legislation could empower the government to conduct "DNA dragnets" that would
channel George Orwell); United States v. Kincadc, 379 F.3d 813. 849 (9th Cir. 2004)
(Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (identifying the "gradual crosion" of Fourith Amendment
protections in US DNA programs, which could lead to the common use of DNA
dragnets).
134. See U.S. CONST. aicnd. IV (prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures);
McCartney, supra note 81 and accompanying text (discussing the implications of the
DNA dragnet on personal libertics); Will, supra note 131, at 130 (criticizing the
unreasonable sweeping nature of the dragnet).
135. See Kevin C. McMunigal, Prosecutors and Corrupt Science, 36 HOFSTRA I RV.
437, 437 (2007) (alluding to cases where prosecutors used corrupt scientific evidence
to secure a conviction which was revealed later by post-conviction rttsctS); Jane C.
Moriarty, Misconvictions. Science, & The Mi nisters oJJustice, 86 NEB. I REV. 1, 6-9 (2007)
(Citing potential flaws in DNA evidence: false testimony by lab experts. uncertified
laboratories handling critical DNA material, DNA analysis being conducted by
individuals outside of scientific fields, and individuals who claim to be able to gauge
information from the DNA analysis which traditionally members of the scientific
community cannot).
136. See Kincade, 379 F.3d at 873 (9th Cir. 2004) (Kozinski, J., dissenting)
(positing that because people leave behind a " bread crumb trail" of material useful for
DNA testing virtually wherever they go, they cannot have a riasonable expectation of
privacy as it pertains to their DNA); see also Elizabeth E. Joh, Reclaiming "Abandoned"
DNA: The Fourth Amendment and Genetic Privacy, 100 Nw. U. L. RL. 837, 875 (noting
tLha "the Fourth Amendment does not appear to restrict the initial collection of
abandoned DNA for any reason.").
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pushed for fingerprinting before American society embraced
it.13 The positive publicity for exonerations of the wrongly
convicted, along with the American precedent of embracing
fingerprinting technology, indicates the likelihood that the
American DNA program will continue to gain acceptance.13
Nevertheless, these lingering unresolved issues suggest that
Marper-like challenges to the US DNA program probably will
temper its rapid expansion.so
C. South African DNA Legislation: "It is Easier to Ask Forgiveness
Than it is to Get Permission"
The United Kingdom, United States, and South Africa each
began using DNA for criminal investigation on an ad hoc basis,
adopting it as a useful tool to aid the pursuit of justice.140 All
three nations had statutes regulating criminal evidence in
general, which courts applied to DNA evidence.141 Then, the US
Congress and the British Parliament each passed specific DNA
legislation.14 2 South Africa has not yet been able to pass similar
DNA legislation.4 3 In Part II.C, this Note analyzes two main
reasons for the slowdown of the DNA Bill: 1) public mistrust of
137. See Kincade, 379 F.3d at 873-74 (9th Cir. 2004) (Kozinski,J., dissenting).
138. See supra notes 127-30, and accompanying text (illustrating a generally
positive American outlook toward new types of scientific evidence and DNA in
particular as a tool to exonerate the wrongly convicted); Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct.
1289, 1298-300 (2011) (awarding a significant kgal victory for the US DNA movement
by recognizing a claim to compel DNA evidence distinct from a post-conviction Brady
claim).
139. See, e.g., Dist. Att'y Office v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308. 2322 (2009)
(recognizing the dearth of Supreme Court rulings thus far substantially weighing in on
DNA issues); Kincade, 379 F.3d at 849 (9th Cir. 2004) (identifying potential future
issues with the DNA program).
140. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text (documenting early DNA
forensics success stories).
141. See LYNCH & HANCOCK, supra not 7. at 33. 41 (describing the application of
pre-existing statutes to DNA evidence; see also supra notes 53, 96, 114, 106-19 and
accompanying text (citing each nation's pre-DNA legislation).
142. See 42 U.S.C. 14132 (2006) (codifying the US DNA program); Protection of
Freedoms Act 2012, ch. 9 (U.K.) (regulating UK DNA management for criminal
investigation).
143. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing the stagnation of DINA
legislation in Parliament).
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government and 2) cautiousness toward infringement upon the
right to privacy. 44
1. Public Mistrust Runs Deep
This Note identifies three sources of public mistrust of the
government: 1) corruption; 2) vestiges of the apartheid era; and
3) the de facto one-party political system. Part II.C analyzes each
of these factors and its effects. This Part concludes with a
discussion of public mistrust and its effect on government.
The new Republic of South Africa emerged as an apartheid-
free democracy in 1994.145 The nation faced the arduous task of
trying to shed the long-term effects of systematic racism and
discrimination.146 The resulting government has operated with a
democratic infrastructure slowed by mistrust and suspicion.147
A major source of public mistrust toward the government is
the perception of widespread corruption.148 The UN Report
stated that South Africans perceive corruption to be rampant
and "one of the most important problems which should be
addressed."14 9 Stemming corruption in the current government
has proven difficult, and corruption has actually expanded in
recent years. 1o
144. See supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text (analyzing apartheid-based
tensions that still exist today); HELEN WALLACE, COL NCTI FOR RESPONSIBLE GENETICS,
PREJUDICE, STIGNL, & DNA DATABASLS 1 (2008), available at http://www.councilfor
respoisiblegenetics.org/pagel)ocuments/P)DAFXSTI)PX.pdf (considering the privacy
threat DNA legislation poses).
145. See Gezclius & Hauck, supra note 32, at 444. 457 (Contemplating the absence
of a civic identity in post-apartheid South Africa); UN REPORT, supra note 10, at 108
(documenting successes and challenges in post-apartheid South Arica).
146. See supra notes 31-36 (describing South Arica's post-apartheid difficulties).
147. See supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text (describing the effects of
corruption upon government).
148. See supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text (documenting the perception
of rampant corruption in South Africa); Wonbin Cho & Matthew F. Kirwin, A Vicious
Circle of Corruption and istrust in Institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Alicro-Level Analsis
1-4 (AfrobaronetLer. Working Paper No. 71, 2007) (identifying the correlation betwCen
corruption and public mistrust).
149. See UN RLPORT, supra note 10, at 3 (reporting the public perception of
widespread corruption in South Africa).
150. See Cristina licchieri & john Duffy, Corruption Cycles, XIy POLITICAL STUDIES
477, 479-81 (1997) (asserting the existence of corruption cycles that keep corrupt
politicians in power); Cho & Kirwin. supra note 148, at 1-4 (describing a sclf-
perpetuating corruption phenomenon).
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Corruption has a recognized slowdown effect on
government operations. 151  In South Africa, it creates
government inefficiencies in terms of lost revenue, misallocation
of resources, and distortion of priorities dictated by public
policy. 5 Corruption's residual effects, such as lost confidence in
public institutions, form a second layer of lag in government
processes.1 53
Post-apartheid public tension and changes to government
structure meant to fix shortcomings in the former regime have
produced unintended consequences in the current
government.154 The constitution's framers created protections
against the flaws of the previous government.155 Identifying the
police as a threat to fundamental rights, the framers put
particular constraints and audits on the SAPS.A6 They created
151. See Okori Uncke, Corruption in Africa South of the Sahara: Bureaucratic
Facilitator or Handicap to Development?, 3 J. PAN AFR. STUDIES 111, 124 (2010)
(recognizing that bloated and expensive bureaucracies, discouragement of investment.
and other inefficiencies caused by corruption outweigh any potential efficiencies
corruption could produce for a government); Cho & Kinin, supra note 148, at 1-4
(noting that "[b]y distorting the delivery of public works, corruption decreases the
efficiency and efficacy with which public administration performs its official funtion of
enhancing the public good").
152. See UN REPORT, supra note 10, at 131-32 (identifying the costs of
corruption); Gaston Kalombo, U nderstanding Political Corruption in Post-Aparitheid
South Africa: The Gauteng Experience (1994-2004) (Oct. 2005) (unpublished Ph.D.
thesis, University of Witwatersrand) (citing Kimberly A. Elliott, Corruption as an
International Policy Problem, POLITICAL CORRUPTION: CONCLPTS & CONTEXTS, 925-41
(A. Heidenheiner & M.Johnston eds., 2001)) (describing the reasons for government
slowdown caused by corruption).
153. See UN RLPORT, supra note 10, at 132 (reporting the negative effects of
corruption); Cho & Kirwin, supra note 148, at 16-17 (incorporating public perception
of corruption and reaction to it as part of the "corruption cyck").
154. See supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text (defining aparthcid-based
tension in terns of race and other factors); Kgosimore, supra note 16, at 2-3 and
accompanying text (discussing the apartheid-period history of abuse toward the
arrested and accused that has influenced an arguably overcompensatory emphasis by
the new government to protect arrestee rights).
155. See S. AFR. CONST., 1996, ch. 1, (founding the Republic of South Africa on
the value of non-racialism and protecting the frecdom of expression); Our Constitution,
Supra note 15 (discussing the significant protections in the Bill of Rights).
156. See S. AFR. CONST., 1996. ch. 2, § 35-36. ch. 11 §205-08, 1996 (protecting
fundamental rights of the arrested and accused and creating the lcgal framework for
the police force); DAVID BR CE, CENTRE FOR THE STUDY OF VIOLENCE AND
RLCONCILIATION. ACCOU.NTABILITY & CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT OF POLICL IN SOUTI AFRICA:
CASLS RLCEIVED BY THE INDLPLNDLNT (OMPL.AINTS DIRLCTORATE 2-5 (2003)
(describing increased accountability oversight directed at police).
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Community Police Forums ("CPFs") to improve crime control,
reduce fear of crime and improve police service and legitimacy
through collaboration between police and community
members.'17 David Bruce, Senior Researcher at the Centre for
the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, identified additional
police accountability mechanisms in South Africa.)5 Despite
these numerous measures, Bruce noted the marginal impact on
police accountability.1 59 Nevertheless, the emergence of reliable
agencies to check government power could become a positive
development in the effort to diminish post-apartheid
suspicion.O
Beyond the initiative to improve accountability, the Bill of
Rights signaled a commitment to protecting fundamental
human rights. 161 During the apartheid era, state violence
commanded attention and harsh criticism.'@6 Due to resulting
suspicion toward law enforcement, the Bill of Rights afforded
significant protection to the arrested and accused.6 As a result
of frequent mistreatment committed by apartheid-period police,
arrestees developed a reputation as victims of corrupt
authority.164 The framers intended for the Bill of Rights to
157. See Commun ity Police Forum,,CO\M NITY POILIC, FORUM, http://
www.cpf.table.Niew.co.za/cpf about.htmil (last visited Nov. 24, 2011) (listing the
objectives of the CPFs). But see BRUCE, sapra note 156, at 3 (observing that the CPs
have not made a significant impact).
158. See BRUCL, supra note 156, at 4 (discussing accountability mechanisms such
as the Department of Safety and Security, the Public Protector, the Human Rights
Commission, the Independent Complaints Directorate and the media, among others).
159. See id. (describing the shortcomings of the accountability measures).
160. See BRU CE, sapra note 156, at 4-5 (discussing the role of accountability
mechanisms in the fight against corruption); SeIby Baqwa, Anti-Corruption Efforts in
South Africa, J. PUB. INOLRY 22 (Fall/Winter 2001), available at
http://Nw.ignet.gov/ randp /0 1c06. pdf (articulating the scope of the National-Anti-
Corruption Forumn).
161. See supra notes 16-24 and accompanying text (discussing the fundamental
right protections under the Bill of Rights).
162. See Paul Lansing & Julic C. King, South Africa's Truth and Reconciliatin
Commission: The Conflict Between Individual Justice and National Healing in the Post-
Apartheid Age, 15 ARIZ.J. INTL & COMP. L 753, 756-57 (1998) (documenting apartheid
era statC violence).
163. See Kgosimore, supra notc 16, at 1 (describing the Bill of Rights as "offender-
friendly"); supra notes 18-24 and accompanying text (outlining the new flundamental
right protections that emphasize the rights of the arrested and accused).
164. See Kgosinore, supra note 16, at 2-3 and accompanying text (discussing the
apartheid-period history of the arrested and accused that shaped perception of the
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reform aspects of the government that allowed arrestee
mistreatment, but the "offender-friendly" language in the Bill of
Rights has had the derivative effect of slighting crime victims.16
Despite new safeguards against law enforcement
misconduct, the South African police arguably still pose a threat
to the public. 166 A February 2011 report ("Police Report"),
commissioned by the Unit for Risk Analysis to determine the
prevalence of police officer crimes or crimes committed by
"people dressed in police uniforms" uncovered one hundred
serious cimes occurring within a fifteen-month period.'67 The
Police Report stated that the problem extends beyond
corruption to a pattern of serious and violent crimes.168 The
prevalence of untrustworthy, corrupt, and violent law
enforcement officials promulgates the government's dubious
arrested and accused today). See generally supra notes 17-24 and accompanying text
(designing a new government that is responsive to occurrences of police brutality).
165. Kgosimorc, supra note 16, at 1-4 and accompanying text (analyzing the
impact of the Bill of Rights); see also supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text
(summarizing the objectives of the Bill of Rights). See generally supra notes 1-5 and
accompanying text (describing the botched criminal investigation which allowed John
Lynch's murderers to avoid detection).
166. See THLTHLKANI NDEBELE ET AL., S. AFR. INST. OF RACE RETATIONS, BROKEN
BLlE LINE: THE IN-VOLVEMENT OF THE SOL TH AFRICAN POLICE IN SERIOUS AND VIOLENT
CRIMLS IN SOLTH AFRICA 5 (2011), available at http://www.sairr.org.za/services/
publications/occasional-reports/ iles/00 1%20-%201roken%2011ue%20L ine%20-11.02.
2011.pdf (Studying 100 acts of police violence); Lydia Polgreen. Mine Strike Mayhen
Stuns South Africa as Police Open Fire. N.Y. TIMLS, Aug. 17, 2012, at A8 (noting that police
use of deadly force against protestors drew comparisons to similar apartheid era
massacres).
167. NDEBELE ET AL., supra notC 166, at 5 (stating that the one hundred incidents
occurring between January 2009 and April 2010 consisted of violent and often pre-
meditated criminal behavior such as ATM bombings, armed robberies, home
robberies, rapes, murders, and assaults).
168. See id. at 7, 8, 12 (highlighting the severity of the corruption problem by
reporting that approximately thirty of the incidents were murders in which issued
service weapons were used and eighteen of the incidents were rapes, usually when an
officer used his official status to force himself upon a woman).
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reputation in South African society.169 Thus, South Africans are
loath to put more power into government hands.170
ANC prominence in South African politics is another
contributing factor to public mistrust.'7 ' By controlling the vast
majority of power in the national government, the ANC
jeopardizes the democracy itself.172 The ANC maintains a large
majority voting block due to the unwavering loyalty of its
constituents.17 The commanding ANC voting block stifles the
voice of dissenters and diminishes the power of the public to
dictate governing policies at the polls.' 74 This substantial level of
169. See id. at 5 (stating that the public has become accustomed to media reports
of police wrongdoing); Erin Conway-Smith, South Africa Troubled by Corrupt Cops,
GLOBAL POST (May 10, 2010, 6:00 AM), http://www.globalpost.con/dispatch/news/
regions/ africa/ south-africa/ 120509/ south-africa-crime-corruption-police-officers-law
(explaining that the high volume of police violence has "erod [ed] public trust" in the
police).
170. See UN RLPORT, supra note 10, at 116 (reporting South Arican feelings that
corruption is a major problem); WALLACE, supra note 144, at 8 (demonstrating the
threat to privacy from giving corrupt officials access to a DNA database).
171. See Sipho Hlongwane, For Democracy's Sake, Mistrust the Government DAILY
MAVERICK (Aug. 16, 2010 06:56 AM), http://dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2010-08-
16-for-democracys-sakc-iistrust-the-governiment (expressing fear for the development
of a "cult of personality" perpetuated by the ANC similar to that embodied by KimJong
11 in North Korea); Horand Knaup &Jan Puhi, "Architcts ofPoverty": The SelfDestruction
ofAfrica's ANC. DER SPIEGEL (Ger.), Aug. 27, 2012, available at http://wyv.spiegel.de/
intLernational/worl d/corruption-violence-and-divisions-tears-at-anc-of-south-africa-a-
852365.html (citing Moeletsi Mbeki's dissatisfaction wvith the way the "political elite"
run the countiy).
172. See Anthony Butler. How Democratic is the African National Congress?, 31 J. S.
AFR. STUD. 719, 722-23, 736 (2005) (questioning the purity of the brand of democracy
practiced by the ANC): see also Phil Mtiikulu. One Part Domination, Transformation, and
Democracy: Critical Challenges Facing the African National Congress (ANC) in the New
Millennium, MOTs PLURITELS (April 2000), http://rmotspluriels.arts.uwa.edi.au/
MP1300pn.htil (referencing the concern of the International Democrat, Union about
the ANC-doininated version of democracy).
173. SeeJulian Ortlepp, Such Blind Loyalty 1Will Keep the ANC in Power, STAR (S. Afr.)
(Apr. 16, 2012), http://www.iol.co.za/the-star/such-blind-loyalty-will-keep-the-anc-in-
power- 1.1276368#.UGZ6p65EOul (criticizing the blind support that many South
Africans give to the ANC despite the dysfiunctional and corrupt state of the government
under ANC lcadership); see also Justin McCarthy, A Marketing Take on Brand ANC: 100
Years of Struggle Manhandled & Abused for Personal Gain, JUTIININZA (Aug. 3. 2012),
http://wwwjustininiza.com/2012/08/a-marlketing-take-on-brand-anc-100-years.html
(arguing that the electorate does not differentiate bctween the former ANC role as
liberator and its current, role as governor).
174. See Mtinkulu, supra note 172 (explaining that the ANC lulfills some of the
criteria discussed by TJ. Pcmpcl on the necessary conditions for one-party dominance);
see also Lesson for the ANG: With Aalena, Silence Is Not Golden, TIMES LIVE (Sept. 12
2012), http://www.timeslive.co.za/opinion/editorials/2012/09/12/lesson-for-the-anc-
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control creates the possibility that the party could pass
legislation contrary to public policy or infringing upon
protected rights.175 This fear that the government will not act in
the best interests of the public is a key facet of the public
Mistrust. 17
The untrustworthy reputation of the South African
government handcuffs its ability to increase law enforcement
autonomy to handle and retain DNA samples.1 77 The United
States and United Kingdom are not free from corruption, but
corruption is much more prevalent in South Africa.'17 South
African suspicion toward infrastructural changes that afford
increased power to the State is not unique for a new
government.179 This phenomenon is similar to American
hostility toward the national bank in the nation's early years. 80
More recently, the Egyptian government following the regime of
Hosni Mubarak faced similar suspicion during the transition of
with-ialcia-silence-is-not-golden (reporting the ANC strategy to expel and ignore
party dissenter julius Malema).
175. See Robyn Dixon, South Africa Secrecy Law Sparks Outry, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 22,
2011), http:// articles.latincs.com /2011 /nov/22/world/la-fg-south -africa-secrets-
20111123 (citing Amnesty International's position that a secrecy law passed in
November 2011 would prevent the exposure of corruption); Building Demnocrac, supra
note 29 (alluding to the dangers of a democracy with one dominant party).
176. See Gezelius & Hauck, supra note 32, at 458-61 (citing a combination of
factors including corruption and the autonomous decision-making by the State as the
cause of public miistrust); Mtimkulu, supra note 172 (tracing public mistrust to ANC
domination of the restructured government following the apartheid era).
177. See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text (outlining procedures that
limit the power of officials conducting DNA databanking to minimize the opportunity
for corruption); see also PORTFOLTO COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 7, at 12 (expressing
concern about the handling of DNA samplcs).
178. See TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL: THE GLOBAL COALITION AGAINST
CORR PTION, ANNU AL REPORT 79 (2010) (ranking the United Kingdom and United
States twsentieth and twenty-second "cicanest" in the world respectively, while South
Africa ranks fifty-fourth). On a scale of one to ten, with one being "highly corrupt" and
ten being "very clean," the United Kingdom received a 7.6 and the United States
received a 7.1. while South Mrica received a 4.5. See id.
179. See, e.g., FLD. RESERVE BANK OF PHILADELPHIA, THE FIRST BANK OF THE
UNITED STATES: A CHAPTER IN THE HISTORY OF CENTRAL BANKING, 2-3 (2009), available
at http: /wwwphiladelphiafed.org/publications/cconomnic-education/first-bank.pdf
(describing tumult in the United States caused by the advent of the National Bank in
1791).
180. See id. at 3 (documenting the Jeffersonian belief that the creation of a
national bank for the newly forined United States was both in violation of the US
Constitution and would dangerously give too much power to the federal government).
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power from the military.181 Measures installed to counter
suspicious actions of a distrusted government often produce side
effects that stymie valid pursuits.182 Since its introduction to
Parliament in December 2008, the DNA Bill has fallen victim to
this phenomenon. 8
2. The Right to Privacy
South Africa has taken substantial steps to protect the right
to privacy.184 Section 38 of the Bill of Rights gives individuals the
ability to enforce in court their right to privacy.18 5 Section 172 of
the Constitution gives courts power to declare any law
inconsistent with the Constitution "invalid to the extent of its
inconsistency."' 86 Additionally, South Africa has a civil tort claim
for invasion of privacy which has developed an extensive
doctrine of law.187
181. See David 1). Kirkpatrick, Judge Helped Egypt Military to Cement Power, N.Y.
TIMES, july 4, 2012, at Al (contemplating the existence of a conspiracy for the military
to maintain authority even in light of its promise to cede power to elcted leaders); see
also Kareem Fahirn, Egyptian Leader Pushes Generals into Re ,,rnt, N.Y. TlES, Aug. 13,
2012, at Al (recognizing concerns that by gaining power from thc military, Egyptian
President Mohamed Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood would become dangerously
strong).
182. See John F. Manning, Separation ofPowers as Ordinar lnterpretation, 124 HARV.
L. REV. 1939. 1959-60, n.106 (2011) (noting that the strict application of the separation
of powers can produce ineficiencies); see also Nathan Myhrvoid, The Virtue ofJnejficient
Government, STATE MAG. (Oct. 18, 1996), http://wwI.slate.corn/articles/briefing/
articles/1996/10/the virtue of inefficientgoverniment.2.htmLi (arguing that a
government framework with too many checks and balances creates inefficiencies).
183. See supra notes 76-77 (describing the slowing effect to the progress of the
DNA Bill caused by pressure on the Portfolio Conittce to properly evaluate all of the
issues involved); see also A New DAN4 Bill, supra note 8 (noting the delay of the DNA
Bill).
184. See S. AFR. CONST., 1996. ch. 2., 14, (providing that "[ec]veryone has the
right to privacy."); jonathan Burchell, The Legal Protection of Privacy in South Africa: A
Transplantable Hybrid EL EC.J. COIP. L 19-23 (2009), available at http://wNT.ejcl.org/
131/artl31-2.pdf (explaining the South African civil claim for invasion of privacy).
185. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, ch. 2, § S8 (vesting the power to bring an action on
ones own behalf. on behalf of another, as a member of a group, in the public interest,
or as an association acting in the interests of its members).
186. See id. ch. 8, § 172 (delegating judicial review power to the courts); Mitra
Ebadolahi, Using Structural lnterdicts and the South African Human Rights Comission to
Achieve Judiil Enforcemnent of Economic and Social Rights in South Africa, 83 N.Y.U. L. RLV.
1565, 15i77 (2008) (surnmarizing the relief afforded to South Africans in constitutional
matters).
187. See Burchell, supra note 184, at 6-13 (discussing tie history and development
of the invasion of privacy claim); see also LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF HONG KONG,
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One privacy concern in the DNA context is the stigma for
an individual whose information is in the database.188
Stigmatization could come in the forms of racial, ethnic, or
other profiling.'"8 Further, retention of DNA samples may cause
the proliferation of bias against the individuals whose samples
are in the database.'190
One emerging legal issue is whether the right to privacy
protects South Africans from having sensitive personal
information discovered through DNA analysis.'0 ' For example,
the genetics community encourages women to undergo genetic
counseling before taking the test for Huntington's Disease, yet
DNA analysis could inadvertently circumvent that process.1 92
Discovery of an individual's genetic defect through DNA analysis
could lead to negative consequences such as discrimination by
an employer or an insurance company.193 DNA analysis could
prove paternity, or lack thereof, causing domestic discord. 194
CTI i LIABILIFY FOR INVASTON OF PRIVACY 6 (2004), available at
http://www.hkreforii.gov.hk'cn/docs/rprivacys-c.doc (identifying South Africa as one
of the few nations that has developed a common law civil remedy for invasion of
privacy).
188. See LYNCH & HANCOCK, supra note 7, at 21 (discussing the potential effect of
such a stigma); WAILACE, supra note 144, at 8 (contemplating the evidence and reasons
for stigmatization of innocent people whose DNA are contained in DNA databases in
the United Kingdom).
189. See Shwayder, supra note 64 and accompanying text (recalling an instance
where investigators made a familial match); supra note 188 and accompanying text
(exploring the risk of stignatization).
190. See WALLACE, supra note 144, at 13-15 (discussing the potential for systematic
discrimination by a DNA program); Atwood, supra note 47 and accompanying text
(describing the process by which an individual whose sampic is in the database would
in effect be treated as a potential suspect in every new DNA case).
191. See Sonia M. Suter, All in the Fanily: Privacy and DNA Familial Searching. 23
HARV. J.L. & TLCH. 309, 347-48 (2010) (pointing out that not all information is
considered good-for example, some families might prefer paternity to remain
undetermined); Gina Kolata. Genes Now Tell Doctors Secrets They Can't Utter. N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 26. 2012, at Al (attesting that " [t]he question of how, when and whether to return
genetic results to study subjects or their families 'is one of the thorniest current
challenges in clinical research"' (quoting Dr. Francis Collins, director of the National
Institutes of Health)).
192. See Suter, supra note 191, at 347-48 (illustrating the Huntington's Disease
dileina): LYNCH & HANCOCK, supra note 7, at 19 (noting that genetic makeup can
determine diseases and behavioral tendencies).
193. See Omphemetse Mooki, DN4 Typing as a Forensic Tool: Applications &
Anplications for CivilLiberties, 13 S. AIR.J. ON H1,M. RTS. 565, 573 (1997) (contemplating
the effects that development in DNA evidence will have on civil libertics); Craig
Timberg, In S. Africa, Stigma Magnifies Pain ofA1DS, WASHINGFON POST, jan. 14, 2005,
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South African privacy concerns are not unlike concerns in
the United States and the United Kingdom. 95 The government's
effort to assuage these privacy concerns has been more difficult
in South Africa because of the reputation of the government,
the residual effects of apartheid, and unease caused by ANC
power.9b In spite of the setbacks, South Africa nevertheless
possesses the components to produce a successful DNA
program.197
III. THE PATH FORW4ARD: DIRECTLY THROUGH THE DAA
BILL
The South African Parliament should pass legislation to fill
the legislative vacuum for the DNA program198 Part III.A asserts
that the DNA Bill in its current form is ready for ratification.
Part III.B discusses broad changes that could have a positive
impact on the future of the DNA Bill.
A. The DNA Bill is Ready for Ratification
South Africans should trust their courts to properly evaluate
fundamental right violations, including those violations in DNA
legislation.'99 Mitra Ebadolahi of the American Civil Liberties
Union explains that the judiciary has the responsibility of
interpreting and enforcing human rights.20 1o This division of
at A14 (documenting the stigma associated with carriers of HIV or AIDS in South
Africa).
194. See Suter, supra note 191, at 365-66 (stating that misattributed paternity has
been estimated as high as ten to thirty percent); Will, supra note 131, at 131-32
(recognizing the threat to privacy from the dissemination of genetic information).
195. See supra notes 94-95, 98-100, 132-37, 184-94 and accompanying text
(summarizing the concerns in each of the respective nations).
196. See supra notes 147-83 and accompanying text (analyzing the role these
factors play).
197. See supra notes 14-24 and accompanying tcxt (describing protections in the
South African Constitution that can facilitate the advent of a fruitful DNA program that
does not violate the right to privacy); supra notes 49-51 (identifying components of a
DNA program which South Africa already has).
198. See supra notes 41, 52-53 and accompanying text (identifying the void of
DNA lcgislation).
199. See supra notes 11. 14 and accompanying text (outlining the rolk of the
judiciary in the government).
200. See Ebadolahi, supra note 186, at 1579-84 (articulating this duty of the
judiciary); supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text (outlining the separation of
powers between the three branches of the government).
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government power, arguably vesting extra authority with the
judiciary, is the same type of system employed in the United
States. 2 1 The framers of the South African Constitution
intended to construct the government in this way.o1 The
Portfolio Committee must develop the DNA Bill to fit within the
framework of the current government structure, which allows
individuals to utilize the courts to challenge any infringement
on protected rights. 203
The DNA legislation passed in the United Kingdom and the
United States would not necessarily address all South African
concerns.204 Trust in the US and UK government systems
enabled the legislature to pass DNA statutes with confidence
that constitutional violations would be addressed by the
judiciary.20 To an extent, the absence of this confidence in the
South African government may be attributed to the
inexperienced government which still creates some discomfort
for the population.2on Structurally, South Africa's government is
capable of passing legislation and maintaining a system of
checks and balances.207
So long as the South African government's system of checks
and balances functions properly, the DNA Bill contains the
proper accountability measures to appropriately regulate the
DNA program. 20s The text of the bill discusses in detail two main
201. See U.S. CONST. arts. I-III (creating a three-branch government with a
legislature, executive, and judiciary)
202. See supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text (describing the powers of each
branch).
203. See supra notes 19-24 and accompanying text (creating a private right of
action for infringement of or threat to a protected right).
204. See supra notes 88-100. 131-35 (illustrating the lkgal issues used by
opponents to challenge the DNA legislation in the United Kingdom and United States,
with these challenges coming long after the bill stage).
205. See, e.g supra notes 88-99. 129 and accompanying text (referencing the
Aftuper and Skinner cases, in which the European Court of Human Rights and US
Supreme Court respectively properly protected fundamental human rights relating to
DNA legislation).
206. See supra notes 31-36 (describing distrust of the still young government); see
supra notes 179-82 (giving examples of distrust toward other young governments acting
to increase power).
207. See supra notes I1-23 and accompanying text (creating the system of checks
and balances perinutting judicial review of lkgislation).
208. See supra notes 42-48 and accompanying text (outlining the key points of the
DNA Hill).
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aspects of the DNA database: 1) the formation and maintenance
of the database, and 2) the power involved in operating the
database. 09 First, concerning formation and maintenance, the
DNA Bill outlines the indexes that will comprise the DNA
database and describes the sources for DNA samples in each of
the indexes.:'o The bill sets baseline standards, but also vests in
the National Commissioner the authority to set other guidelines
at his discretion. 11 Second, the DNA Bill sets several
accountability mechanisms to temper state authority to run the
database: 1) the baseline provisions in Section 150 to 15Q 2)
the provision for any rule changes by the National
Commissioner to be tabled in Parliament within three months,
and 3) the National Commissioner's report to Parliament.212
The substantial power vested in the National Commissioner
is a weakness in the DNA Bill.213 The accountability mechanisms,
functioning properly, should create the means to sufficiently
contain the National Commissioner's power.214 Nevertheless, in
a corrupt and distrusted state, the authority vested in the
National Commissioner to operate the DNA program raises
concern.21 The DNA Bill can reduce this power by describing
more specifically the details of the DNA program.2"1 On the
other hand, the particular details of running a DNA program
are very technical in nature, so it may be wise to avoid legislating
specific database details and instead to permit the experts in
209. See supra notes 42-48 and accompanying text (structuring the DNA program
and apportioning powers within it).
210. See Criminal Law (Forensic Procedures) Amendment Bill of 2008 § 15G (S.
Ar.) (creating the set of indexes comprising the database).
211. See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text (setting the baseline standards
for the progriam and apportioning database-related authority).
212. See supra notes 42-48 and accompanying text (creating accountability
measures to check the power of privileged officials).
213. See supra notes 43, 46, 48 and accompanying text (vesting significant power in
the National Commissioner).
214. See Criminal Law (Forensic Procedures) Amendment Bill, 2008, Bill 15M-
S (S. Ar.) (describing the checks upon officials with power within the proposed DINA
program).
215. See supra notes 36-38, 41, 147-53 and accompanying text (summarizing
public perception of corruption by government officials).
216. See supra notes 42-48 and accompanying text (outlining the parameters of
the DNA program).
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database management to recommend appropriate procedures
after statutory parameters are in place.21
Another way to limit the power of the National
Commissioner is to give the database-management powers to a
committee rather than to one official.218 Nevertheless, the DNA
program would likely function satisfactorily, even with one
official's substantial power, within a government a system of
reliable checks and balances.21 9
B. Changes to Facilitate DNTA Bill's Success
The DNA Bill must overcome public distrust to become law,
as it necessarily encroaches upon personal liberties to collect
and retain DNA samples in the database. 22) Proponents of the
DNA Bill cannot quell all concerns about government
usurpation of power because increased state power is inherent
in the advent of the database." 2' By addressing privacy concerns
and working to increase public trust in government, South
Africa can improve its government system to both pass the DNA
Bill and make the legislative process more efficient.22
Improving public trust of government surely is a tall task,
but several methods might jump start the process. The passage
of time will facilitate the easing of post-apartheid tension." A
relatively new government should expect public suspicion of any
217. See supra notes 42-48 and accompanying text (focusing more on the
structure of the database while providing limited technical detail).
218. See supra notes 43, 46, 48 and accompanying text (delegating database-
management powers to the National Commissioner).
219. See supra notes 79-119. 124-38 (excnplifying the way that a government with
proper checks and balances can sustain the ratifcation of a law that has the potential to
compromise certain rights).
220. See supra notes 10. 77-78 (discussing the arguably irreconcilable
considerations causing the Portfolio Committee to delay the DNA Bill).
221. See supra notes 10, 42-48, 77-78 (describing aspects of the DNA Bill which by
their nature require increased government power).
222. See supra notes 54-62, 77-78 (illustrating the focused mindset of the
committee on the DNA Bill, which may have clouded the view of broad and underlying
issues in the government).
223. Seesupra notes 31-35 and accompanying text (documenting positive changes
that alircady have occurred since the formation of the new government in 1994 such as
substantial racial ten)sion substantially subsiding due to tie combination of interracial
contact and the passage of time).
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acts construable as usurpations of power.224 Over time, a
government that shows its stability and restraint of power can
build public trust.22 5
Mistrust in government inhibits efficiency of the
democracy. 2 The South African government can shed its
negative reputation by emphasizing the enforcement of the
checks of power built into the government.227 Over time, the
judiciary can increasingly endear itself to public trust with a
pattern of protecting fundamental rights, invalidating portions
of laws which violate protected rights, and expressing sound
legal reasoning? Similarly, the executive and legislative
branches can improve public perception of the government by
functioning properly and curbing their own actions that
threaten protected rights."2 "
An affirmative anti-corruption initiative starting from the
top-down could combat any real or perceived corruption trends
regarding its prevalence at the national level.2 3o The media has
played a significant role in the perception of a corrupt State.231
The media has further demonstrated its power by proliferating
the public perception of rampant corruption in South Africa.
If government accountability measures take effect to reduce
corruption, the media will play a key role in shaping public
224. See supra notes 179-81 (illustrating public cautiousness toward the
usurpation of power by a young government).
225. See supra notes 166-77 and accompanying text (identifying current facets of
the South Arican government with a dubious reputation where there is room for
improvement).
226. See supra notes 148-76 (describing the current South African government
and its systematic problems).
227. See supra notes 11-24 and accompanying text (citing the Bill of Rights and
the accountability mechanisms within the government).
228. See supra notes 88-99, 129 and accompanying text (demonstrating this effect
from the respective appellate tribunals that review UK and US legislation).
229. See Dixon, supra note 175 (describing the ratification of the secrecy bill which
critics assert dangerously infringes upon freedom of expression); Polgreen, supra note
166 and accompanying text (illustrating another incident that diminished public trust
in authority).
230. See supra notes 39-41, and accompanying text (drawing the connection
between the media and the government's corrupt reputation).
231. See UN RLPORT, supra note 10, at 10 (noting the rolk of the media in the
public perception of corruption).
232. See id. (discussing media influence).
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perception of this important development." Public perception,
and not just government functionality, will significantly
influence future government effectiveness.23 4
CONCLUSION
The DNA Bill is ready for ratification.235 Its delay is partially
based on concerns regarding privacy issues, but in large part, it
represents the inefficiency of the South African government.23
By activating accountability measures already in place to defeat
corruption and human rights violations, the government can
change public perception.23 The eradication of corruption
would help develop a healthier, more efficient South African
government, and help to pass the DNA Bill.23 8
Recent events do not suggest that such change to the
government's approach is imminent."' If changes to improve
the government efficiency do not occur, the DNA Bill still
should pass, but it will be met by the same suspicion facing other
acts of the mistrusted government.24 o The accountability
measures built into the DNA Bill, without an initiative to make
effective such checks on government power, may not have the
desired effect to curb law enforcement database privilege abuse
233. See supra notes 40-41. and accompanying text (observing the media's
influential power).
234. See supra notes 146-81 (analyzing the relationship bctween the actual
functionality of government and the public perception).
235. See supra notes 199-224 and accompanying text (evaluating the text of the
DNA Bill).
236. See supra notes 151-53 and accompanying tcxt (discussing the slowing effect
caused by public mistrust of government and concern for protection of privacy
interests).
237. See supra notes 11-24. 156-60 and accompanying text (describing the
accountability measures already in place).
238. See supra notes 147-77 and accompanying text (pointing to the corruption
that currently deters the progress of the South Arican government).
239. See Dixon, supra note 175 (characterizing the ratiication of the secrecy bill as
a step backward for the legislature by dcsecrating the protected freedoin of
expression); Polgrccn, supra notc 166 (vilifying thc massacre as a major blow to the
already tenuous public perception of authority).
240. See supra notes 147-77 (demonstrating South African citizcns' suspicion of
government); supra notes 53, 64, 213-17 and accompanying [Cxt (illustrating the
reasons for passing the bill).
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or to improve confidence in criminal investigation.24 1 If
Parliament passes the DNA Bill but cannot reform the subsidiary
aspects of the government necessary for the DNA Program to
properly function, South Africa will probably realize some, but
not nearly all of the benefits normally associated with a national
DNA Program24 2
241. See supra notes 42-48 and accompanying text (outlining procedures and
accountability measures for the DNA program); supra notes 151-53 and accompanying
text (discussing the negative effects of public mistrust on government functionality and
efficiency).
242. See supra notes 63-74 and accompanying text (describing the benefits of a
DNA program); supra notes 146-77 and accompanying text (analyzing the negative
impact of public mistrust on government effectiveness).
